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The functional anatomy and connectivity of thought insertion and 
alien control of movement 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Alien control phenomena are symptoms reported by patients with schizophrenia whereby feelings 
of control and ownership of thoughts and movements are lost. Comparable alien control 
experiences occur in culturally influenced dissociative states. We used fMRI and suggestions for 
automatic writing in highly hypnotically suggestible individuals to investigate the neural 
underpinnings of alien control. Targeted suggestions selectively reduced subjective ratings of 
control and ownership for both thought and movement.  Thought insertion was associated with 
reduced activation of networks supporting language, movement, and self-related processing.  In 
contrast, alien control of writing movement was associated with increased activity of a left-
lateralised cerebellar-parietal network and decreased activity in brain regions involved in voluntary 
movement, including sensory-motor hand areas and the thalamus.  Both experiences involved a 
reduction in activity of left supplementary motor area (SMA) and were associated with altered 
functional connectivity between SMA and brain regions involved in language processing and 
movement implementation. Collectively these results indicate the SMA plays a central role in alien 
control phenomena as a high level executive system involved in the sense that we control and own 
our thoughts and movements. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
As humans we can readily detect whether our bodily movements are self-generated or externally 
caused, and typically experience a sense of control and ownership of our thoughts. These fundamental 
features of experience are disrupted in psychiatric symptoms of alien control, where patients describe 
their thoughts and/or their movements as under the control of an external agent (Frith, 2005).  For 
example, during the experience of thought insertion (TI), the patient “believes that thoughts that are 
not his own have been inserted into his mind” (Mullins & Spence, 2003). Mellor’s classic example 
(Mellor, 1970) cites a patient’s experience:  ‘I look out of the window and I think the garden looks nice 
and the grass looks cool, but the thoughts of Eamonn Andrews [TV presenter] come into my mind. 
There are no other thoughts there, only his. . . He treats my mind like a screen and flashes his thoughts 
onto it like you flash a picture.’  Similarly, experiences of alien control of movement (ACM) involve the 
experience that movement is under the control of some force or entity outside the self, as in patient 
reports, such as, ‘they inserted a computer in my brain. It makes me turn to the left or right’; or “my 
fingers pick up the pen but I don’t control them” (Mellor, 1970).   
Previous studies of the cognitive and neural bases of alien control phenomena have tended to focus 
on mechanisms underlying alien control of movement (Frith, 2005). We know of no published studies 
using functional imaging to investigate brain activity during thought insertion. Nevertheless, 
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neurocognitive models of both thought insertion and alien control of movement have been proposed 
in which both phenomena are the result of aberrant self-monitoring  (Haggard, Cartledge, Dafydd, & 
Oakley, 2004; Szechtman, Woody, Bowers, & Nahmias, 1998).  At a neural level, problems with self-
monitoring have been linked to a ‘forward model’ where processing of movement-related sensory 
feedback involving a parietal-cerebellar network is subject to feed-forward inhibition during voluntary 
movements (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008). In this model, alien control of movement results 
from failure of feed-forward inhibition, so that self-generated movements are experienced as though 
they are externally caused (Frith, 2005). A previous study investigated the neural correlates of alien 
control of movement by employing hypnotic suggestion and Positron Emission Tomography (PET) in 
healthy participants (S. J. Blakemore, Oakley, & Frith, 2003).  Experimental conditions included 
misattributions of self-generated movement while participants produced repetitive vertical 
movements with their left arm. These ‘deluded passive movements’ were associated with significantly 
greater activations in bilateral cerebellum and parietal cortex relative to normal self-generated 
voluntary movements. Failure to attenuate sensory processing for what in reality were self-generated 
movements was proposed to underlie the observed increases in cerebellar-parietal activity during 
deluded passive movements (S. J. Blakemore et al., 2003).   
 
Deeley et al., (2013b) offered an alternative account of the experience of alien control of movement. 
This ‘executive control’ model proposes that alien control phenomena may be mediated by altered 
activity in motor planning regions, in particular the supplementary motor area (SMA) (Deeley et al., 
2013b).  Reduced connectivity between SMA and motor implementation regions, including M1, during 
suggested involuntary compared to voluntary joystick movements was observed in our prior study. 
This finding is consistent with the proposed role of the SMA in the control and ownership of 
movements (Fried, Mukamel, & Kreiman, 2011; Grafton, Mazziotta, Woods, & Phelps, 1992; Haggard, 
2008; Haggard & Magno, 1999; Nachev, Kennard, & Husain, 2008; Penfield & Welch, 1951).   While 
cognitive neuroscience research to date has focused on alien control of movement, thought insertion 
symptoms remain twice as prevalent in patients with schizophrenia (Grafton, Mazziotta, Presty, et al., 
1992; Mellor, 1970). Both thought insertion and alien control of movement also occur in other 
psychiatric disorders (Mullins & Spence, 2003) and have been observed in the general population 
(Wiles et al., 2006).  Non-pathological instances of thought insertion and alien control of movement 
include culturally influenced dissociative phenomena linked to practices such as mediumship and 
automatic writing, which have been widely reported across different cultures and periods of history 
(Crapanzano & Garrison, 1977; Deeley, 2013; Ellenberger, 1970; Vitebsky, 2001).  
 
By analogy with the forward model account of alien control of movement, it has been suggested that 
the experience of thought insertion may result from impaired monitoring of self-generated thought 
(Feinberg, 1978; Frith, 2005).  This proposal has been criticised on the grounds that thoughts, unlike 
movements, do not have well defined sensorimotor characteristics that could inform feed-forward 
inhibition of self-monitoring systems (Synofzik et al., 2008).  The alternative ‘executive control’ model 
- assuming an analogy with the proposed role of the SMA in alien control of movement - would argue 
that a disruption of SMA function during generation of thoughts produces a loss of perceived control 
and ownership. However, a method for the experimental study of the neural basis of thought insertion 
does not exist. Experimental investigation of these unresolved questions about thought insertion, and 
its relation to alien control of movement, is especially challenging as thought is a covert process 
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(Mullins & Spence, 2003).  Also, the effects observed in our prior study involving simple joystick 
movements may not generalise to complex movements such as handwriting. 
To investigate the neural bases of thought insertion and alien control of complex movements we 
extended the approach described in previous studies (Quinton Deeley et al., 2013; Walsh et al., 2014) 
by combining fMRI and suggestions for automatic writing in highly hypnotically suggestible individuals,  
employing a sentence completion task where thought and movement occur sequentially and 
discretely (see Figure 1a).   Writing involves expressing thoughts in words and then using hand 
movements to write the words down (Beeson, 2004).  Cognitive and clinical models suggest that both 
thought and movement components of writing, though clearly linked, are nevertheless separable 
(Magrassi, Bongetta, Bianchini, Berardesca, & Arienta, 2010; Scarone et al., 2009). Furthermore, 
subjective reports of automatic writing suggest that the thought content and motor act of writing can 
be independently experienced as externally caused (Britton, 1997).  Thus, a handwriting task provides 
a model system to investigate both types of alien control where targeted suggestions can be employed 
to generate separate experiences of thought insertion and alien control of movement.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Schematic of experimental rationale. a) According to models of writing (Sage & Ellis, 2004), production 
of a written word involves serial thought and movement processes.  b) This linear order allows the thought and 
movement components of writing to be targeted independently via suggestion to produce automatic writing 
(See also Table 4). Mean control c) and ownership d) ratings for voluntary writing (VOL), during suggestions of 
thought insertion (TI) and alien control of movement (ACM) experiences, and instructions for simulation of alien 
control of movement (SIM).  Standard deviations are shown as error bars.  Note the double dissociation for the 
thought and movement components of writing for control and ownership ratings, in both the thought insertion 
(TI) and alien control of movement (ACM) conditions (p < 0.001; 4 middle bars, graphs a and b).  
 
 
At a phenomenological level, we hypothesised that targeted suggestions would be associated with 
reductions in control and ownership of the thought and motor components of writing respectively, in 
line with previous findings (Walsh et al., 2014). At a neural level, we made predictions based on the 
forward and executive control models informed by previous studies (S. J. Blakemore et al., 2003; Q. 
Deeley et al., 2013; Synofzik et al., 2008). Specifically, in keeping with the forward model of motor 
control, we predicted that suggested alien control of complex movement would be associated with 
increased activity of a bilateral cerebellar-parietal network, as previously described for alien control 
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of simple repetitive movement (S. J. Blakemore et al., 2003). However, following criticisms of the 
application of comparator or forward models to thought insertion (Synofzik et al., 2008), we did not 
predict increases in activity in brain regions involved in self-monitoring during thought insertion. Since 
thought is closely linked to language production (Dennett, 2008; Pinker, 1994), we postulated that the 
experience of thought insertion would involve altered activity in temporal and frontal cortical 
language generation areas (Kim, Relkin, Lee, & Hirsch, 1997; Price, 2000), rather than changes in 
cerebellar–parietal activation.  Also, in keeping with the executive control model, we predicted that 
both alien control of movement and thought would be associated with altered connectivity between 
supplementary motor area (SMA) and modality specific regions.  We also explored changes in 
connectivity with sensorimotor cortex. In the case of SMA, we predicted that alien control of 
movement would be associated with reduced connectivity with motor implementation regions 
(Quinton Deeley et al., 2013), while alien control of thought would be associated with reduced 
connectivity with temporal-frontal regions involved in language generation.  
 
2. METHOD 
2.1 Participants 
Eighteen right-handed [Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971) mean scores: right hand: 18 
(SD=1); left hand: 1 (SD=2)], highly hypnotically suggestible [Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic 
Susceptibility: Form A (Shor and Orne, 1963); Scale range 0-12; High > 8  mean score = 9.7; SD=1.4] 
native English-speaking participants (13 female), mean age 26.2 (SD=8.3) years were recruited with 
informed consent from a pool of approximately 350 volunteers who had been screened for 
suggestibility.  All participants were tested behaviourally in a mock training scanner to ensure 
compatibility prior to participating in the fMRI study (Walsh et al., 2014).  This research was conducted 
in accordance with Research Ethics Committee approval at King’s College London.   
 
2.2 Procedure 
 
The procedures were largely based on a preliminary behavioural study (Walsh et al., 2014).  Briefly, 
after a hypnotic induction procedure, consisting of visual fixation combined with instructions and 
suggestions for focused attention and progressive relaxation (Deeley et al., 2012; D. A. Oakley, Deeley, 
& Halligan, 2007), targeted hypnotic suggestion was used to produce automatic writing in healthy 
participants in order to create separate experiences of alien control for thought and movement during 
a sentence completion task (Figure 1 and Table 4) [For background information on hypnotic 
techniques and the use of hypnotic suggestion as a research tool in cognitive neuroscience see Oakley 
& Halligan (2009, 2013) and Halligan & Oakley (2013)].  During the suggestions, an ‘engineer’ was 
nominated as the agent of alien control.  Participants were presented with 10 sentence stems, i.e. 10 
trials, in each experimental block.  Each trial had an interval for generation of a sentence ending 
(‘preparation interval’) and an interval for writing it down (‘movement interval’).  Stimulus words used 
for the sentence stems were based on common nouns found in the British National Corpus and were 
matched across conditions for frequency in written and spoken English.  At the end of each block, 
participants verbally rated (‘0’ – ‘10’) their subjective experience for each suggested (TI and ACM) 
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condition immediately following each scanning block with respect to: (i) control (‘0’ = ‘no control’, and 
‘10’ = ‘full control’); (ii) ownership (‘0’ = ‘no ownership’, and ‘10’ = ‘full ownership’) and (iii) awareness 
(‘0’ = ‘no awareness’, and ‘10’ = ‘full awareness’).  Additionally ratings were taken for subjective ‘depth 
of hypnosis,’ also rated from ‘0’ (‘not at all hypnotized’) – ‘10’ (‘as hypnotized as I’ve ever been’).  The 
four randomized experimental writing conditions differed only in terms of whether thought or 
movement was attributed to ‘self’ or to ‘alien’ control (Table 4).  Participants were hypnotized and 
kept their eyes closed throughout.   
Each trial consisted of a thought and movement interval.  At the start of the preparation interval, 
participants were presented with a sentence stem e.g. ‘The dog…’, which was repeated once.  
Participants were instructed to think of an ending (voluntary thought) or, in the thought insertion 
condition, it was suggested that ‘an engineer is inserting a sentence ending into your mind’. A tone 
marked the start of the movement interval.  Upon presentation of the tone, participants were 
instructed to write down the sentence ending from the preparation interval (voluntary movement).  
Alternatively, during the alien control of movement condition it was suggested to participants that ‘an 
engineer is controlling your hand movements as you write’.  A second tone marked the end of the 
trial.  Each trial was succeeded by an 8 second rest interval.  Trial interval durations were jittered by 
up to 500ms from trial to trial. Video recordings were made throughout the task to confirm adherence 
to the instructions and record movement initiation times. 
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Table 4. The four experimental conditions. 
 
Condition Suggestion / Instruction Focus of control 
  Thought 
component 
 Movement 
Component 
1. Voluntary 
(VOL) 
 
 ‘When you hear the sentence stem, your job is to quickly 
think of a short simple suitable ending and then hold it in 
your mind and wait for the 1st tone.  When you hear this 
tone, write down the short simple ending to the sentence 
that you held in your mind.  Once you hear the 2nd tone – 
stop writing immediately.’ 
Self 
 
 Self 
2. Thought 
insertion (TI) 
 
‘When you hear the sentence stem, you will have the 
experience that an Engineer has composed and then 
inserted a short simple suitable ending to the sentence into 
your mind. This happens immediately after the sentence 
stem, and before the 1st tone is heard - When you hear the 
1st tone, recall the Engineer’s short simple ending to the 
sentence and write it down in your normal handwriting - 
However, the Engineer has no control over your 
movements.’ 
Alien  Self 
3. Alien 
control of 
movement 
(ACM) 
 
‘When you hear the sentence stem, then think of a short 
simple suitable ending to the sentence, hold it in your mind, 
and wait for the 1st tone.  When you hear this tone, you will 
have the experience of the movements of your right hand 
being initiated and controlled by an Engineer; these 
movements cause the marker to write down the sentence 
ending which you kept in mind, each time.  Just hold the 
marker, the rest will happen by itself - However, the 
Engineer cannot control your thoughts, only your hand 
movements when writing.  You and you alone, think of the 
endings to each sentence and only you hold these in your 
mind.’   
Self 
 
 Alien 
4. Simulation 
(SIM) 
 
‘As you write, maintain your normal handwriting, but this 
time and this time only, just pretend that the movements of 
your right hand are being initiated and controlled by an 
Engineer.  You and you alone, cause the marker to move, no 
one else.’ 
Self 
 
 Self 
 
 
 
2.3 Image Acquisition Parameters 
Functional MRI was carried out at the Centre for Neuroimaging Sciences, King’s College London, UK. 
A GE Signa HDx 3.0T scanner was used with an 8-channel head coil to acquire T2* gradient echo, 
echoplanar imaging (GE-EPI) data (TR = 2000msec, TE = 30msec, Flip angle = 80°) in the near-axial 
orientation, parallel to the anterior-posterior commissure (AC-PC) line. Whole-brain volumes (150 per 
participant, per experimental condition), consisting of 38 slices (3.3mm thick, 0.3mm slice gap), were 
imaged using a top down sequential acquisition (matrix size = 64 x 64, FoV = 230mm2). Structural high-
resolution EPI (HR-EPI) scans were also acquired for each participant with the following parameters: 
TR=3000ms, TE=30msec, Flip angle = 90, 43 slices (3.3m, 0.3mm slice gap), matrix size = 128 x 128, 
FoV = 240mm2. 
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2.4 Neuroimaging data analysis  
Functional images were processed and analysed in SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). All 
images were initially realigned to first image and then their mean image. The mean image was spatially 
normalized to the SPM8 EPI template and spatially smoothed (8 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel), and 
high-pass filtered (128 s).  For the single subject first level analysis, the preparation onsets and 
durations, movement onsets and durations and head motion parameters were entered as regressors.  
The group ANOVA second level analysis included all experimental conditions for all participants.  All 
images were corrected for multiple comparisons at the cluster level (p<0.05) with voxel threshold 
p<0.001. 
 
2.5 PPI Procedure 
We conducted a psycho-physiological Interaction (PPI) analysis to assess the influence of suggestions 
for TI and ACM on changes in functional connectivity associated with response preparation 
(preparation interval) and execution (writing interval) during the sentence completion task.  Two seed 
regions were chosen based on the group-analysis peak voxel results of the General Linear Model 
(GLM) for writing in the normal alert state,: (1) the left supplementary motor area (SMA; MNI 
coordinates = [-8, 4, 60]) for its key role in movement preparation (Nachev et al., 2008), and its 
association with control and ownership of movement (Deeley et al. 2013) and (2) the left primary 
motor-sensory region, encompassing M1 because of its dual (language and movement) role in writing. 
For simplicity we refer to this seed as ‘M1’ (MNI coordinates = [-28, -32, 52]). The seed for the PPI 
analysis for each participant was defined as the eigenvalue for a 6mm radius sphere around the peak 
activation nearest the seed coordinates. In order to ensure the data were from the same functional 
locale across all individuals, we excluded participants for whom the Euclidian distance between the 
peak activation voxel per condition closest to the seed coordinates exceeded 6 mm. Therefore, the 
PPI analysis of the SMA seed for the preparation and movement intervals included 18 and 15 
participants respectively while for the M1 seed preparation and movement intervals included 10 and 
15 participants respectively.  We used a voxel-wise threshold of p<0.01, with statistical inference 
based on a cluster statistics threshold of P<0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons.  For the PPI 
analyses the single-subject models included regressors for the seed region, the task design (from the 
preparation and movement intervals), their interaction (Friston et al., 1997), and the six movement 
parameters. The PPI contrast image was entered into a flexible factorial ANOVA model including 7 
experimental conditions.  For each seed region, these individual PPI contrast images were then 
entered into a two-sample t-test at the second (group) level to test between condition differences.  
 
 
3. RESULTS 
 
3.1 Self-ratings and writing behaviour 
To determine if the focused attentional state which we term ‘hypnosis’ was established and 
maintained across the experimental conditions, an ANOVA was performed with the factor of 
experimental condition, with self-ratings (depth of hypnosis) as the dependent variable.  Subjective 
self-ratings for depth of hypnosis (mean rating = 7.8) did not differ across conditions (F<1.5).  In order 
to determine if the various suggestions were successful in altering subjective experience, a repeated 
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measures ANOVA was performed with the factors of cognitive and motor components of writing 
(thought vs. movement) and experimental condition (4 conditions), with self-ratings (awareness, 
control, ownership) as dependent variables.  Critically, we found that subjective feelings for control 
and ownership of thought and movement components of writing could be independently manipulated 
(Figure 1c,d; Interaction: F(1, 17)=36.98; p<0.0001).   
 
During suggestions of thought insertion, participants’ ratings of control and ownership of thought but 
not the movement component of writing were reduced relative to the voluntary control condition.  
During suggestions of alien control of movement, the reverse was true i.e. there were reduced ratings 
for control and ownership of movement but not for the thought component of writing.  To control for 
the possibility that participants were simulating the suggested effects, we also included a simulation 
condition (SIM) where participants were instructed to “just pretend” that an engineer was controlling 
their hand movements as they wrote.  There was an interaction between ratings for simulation, and 
both thought insertion and alien control of movement conditions (all F>27.2), indicating that 
subjective experience was rated differently between the simulation (SIM) and suggestion (TI, ACM) 
conditions.  There were no interactions between ratings for voluntary writing and simulation. (F<3.8; 
see Figure 1). Collectively these results provide behavioural evidence that participants were not 
simulating during the suggestion (TI, ACM) conditions.  
 
While the conditions reported here did not employ targeted suggestions to reduce awareness during 
automatic writing, ratings for awareness nevertheless followed a similar pattern as for control and 
ownership.  Relative to voluntary control, awareness of movement, but not thought, was reduced 
during suggestions for ACM. Relative to voluntary control, awareness of thought, but not movement, 
was reduced during suggestions for TI. However, estimates of effect size were lower for awareness 
ratings (partial Eta squared = 0.347) than control (0.634) and ownership (0.684) ratings for the 2 
(condition: TI vs. ACM) x 2 (components of writing: thought vs. movement) interactions.  Overall, 
suggestions for thought insertion and alien control of movement produced a greater effect on 
respective self-ratings of control and ownership than on awareness.  A subsequent regression analysis 
of the behavioural awareness ratings with brain activity did not show any significant or trend 
relationships, including in areas of altered activity with suggested loss of control (all p > 0.41 for the 
TI contrast, and all p > 0.15 for the ACM contrast; see below).  In summary, the suggestions produced 
the intended effects and these were not paralleled in the simulation condition. 
 
Writing behaviour as measured by quantity of writing produced, onset latency, duration of writing and 
semantic content of words (Davis, 2005) did not differ across conditions.  Also, the number of words 
(mean=2.7; SD=0.8) and characters (mean=11.2; SD=3.7) written per sentence-ending did not differ 
across experimental condition (Fs<1.5).  Similarly, onset latency (mean=1613; SD=537 msec) and 
duration of writing (mean=6155; SD=1514 msec) as measured using video analysis did not differ 
(Fs<2.9).  There were no differences in written word frequency or imageability (Fs<1.6) (Walsh et al., 
2014).  In summary, the written form and semantic content of the writing were consistent across 
conditions. 
 
3.2 Imaging results 
 
Activations produced by writing in the normal alert state (i.e. before the hypnotic induction 
procedure) showed that (i)  in the preparation interval, left SMA, left inferior frontal operculum 
(Broca’s area) and right cerebellum were significantly activated relative to rest, and (ii)  in the 
movement interval left primary and somatosensory cortices, as well as right cerebellum, were 
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activated.  Importantly, the contrast of suggested ACM (ACM condition) and simulated ACM (SIM 
condition) showed significant differences (Table 2), indicating that participants were not engaging in 
simulation strategies. 
 
3.3 Thought insertion contrast (TI vs. VOL) 
To identify brain regions involved in the experience of thought insertion when it was suggested to 
participants that ‘‘the engineer is inserting sentence endings into your mind” during the preparation 
interval, activity in the voluntary and thought insertion experimental conditions were compared.  
During the preparation interval, the thought insertion relative to the voluntary condition was 
associated with a relative decrease in activity in left SMA, basal ganglia and striatal areas, and 
bilaterally in the precuneus and in temporal areas.  Reduced activation was also observed in right 
superior occipital cortex and thalamus (Table 1a; Figure 2a).  During the movement interval, there was 
a relative decrease in activity in left mid-temporal, SMA, precentral, inferior frontal and superior 
temporal and occipital as well as right superior frontal gyri. Bilateral reductions were observed in mid 
frontal gyri and mid-cingulum (see Table 1a). 
 
 
Table 1.  SPM results for the contrast between a) suggested thought insertion (TI) and voluntary writing (VOL) 
and b) suggested alien control of movement (ACM) and voluntary writing (VOL) for the preparation and 
movement intervals of a trial. 
Hemisphere Anatomical  Region MNI coordinates 
x, y, z 
BA Cluster size Z value Cluster-level 
p corrected 
a) THOUGHT INSERTION CONTRAST 
Preparation Interval  VOL > TI     
L SMA -10, -14, 58 6 5348 5.58 0.000 
R Thalamus 14, -28, 8 -  5.13  
L Pallidum -22, 0, 2 -  5.01  
R Putamen 26, 16, 6 48 925 5.31 0.001 
L Superior Temporal -42, -42, 12 41 849 4.90 0.001 
L Inferior Temporal -52, -56, -6 37  4.80  
R Superior Occipital 24, -70, 34 19 346 4.60 0.045 
R Precuneus 16, -66, 44 7  3.91  
L Precuneus -8, -58, 46 - 317 4.38 0.048 
R Superior Temporal 62, -34, 16 42 459 4.35 0.018 
R Mid-Temporal 48, -46, 14 21  3.54  
Movement interval VOL > TI     
L Mid-Temporal  -46, -42, 10 21 4391 5.14 0.000 
L Precentral -20, -32, 76 6  4.73  
L Superior Temporal -34, -18, 66 48  4.67  
L Superior Occipital -14, -74, 42 19 2596 5.04 0.000 
R Mid-Cingulum 10, 4, 44 24  4.72  
L Mid-Cingulum -6, -30, 44 23  4.53  
L Mid-Frontal -34, 34, 24 46 439 4.27 0.024 
L Inferior Frontal -38, 30, 18 48  3.91  
R Mid-Frontal 38, 40, 26 48 562 4.02 0.010 
R Superior Frontal 22, 50, 20 46  3.94  
b) ALIEN CONTROL OF MOVEMENT CONTRAST 
Preparation Interval  VOL > ACM     
L SMA -8, -14, 58 6 1938 5.25 0.000 
L Postcentral -20, -32, 76 4  4.68  
L Precentral -34, -18, 66 6  4.60  
 ACM > VOL      
11 
 
L Cerebellum -18, -52, -14 37 590 4.27 0.006 
L Lingual -18, -84, 2 18  3.69  
Movement Interval  ACM > VOL     
L Angular -40, -68, 38 19 436 4.13 0.025 
Notes: BA = Brodmann Area 
 
Table 2.  SPM results showing differences in activation for the contrast between suggested alien control of 
movement (ACM) and instructed simulation of alien control of movement (SIM). 
Hemisphere Anatomical  Region MNI coordinates 
x, y, z 
BA Cluster size Z value Cluster-level 
p corrected 
Preparation Interval ACM > SIM     
L Cerebellum  -14, -60, -12 18 991 4.85 0.000 
Movement interval      
R Posterior Cingulum  8, -38, 30 23 1541 5.66 0.000 
L Posterior Cingulum -10, -48, 34 23    
L Mid-Cingulum 0, -38, 44 -    
L Angular -48, -68, 32 39 1095   
L Inferior Parietal -48, -56, 42 39    
R Superior Medial Frontal 12, 50, 30 32 3288   
L Superior Medial Frontal -2, 32, 52 8    
L Superior Frontal -16, 34, 38 32    
Notes: BA = Brodmann Area 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  a) Neural correlates of thought insertion (VOL > TI).  Reduced brain activity during suggestions for the 
experience of thought insertion during the preparation (top) and movement (bottom) intervals of a trial.  No 
significant changes in activation were observed for the reverse contrast (TI > VOL).   b) Neural correlates of the 
experience of alien control of movement (ACM).  Comparison of panels a) and b) above, indicate distinct patterns 
of brain activity for the different targeted suggestions.  No changes in activation were observed for the 
movement interval in the VOL > ACM contrast.   
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3.4 Alien control of movement contrast (ACM vs. VOL) 
We compared the voluntary (VOL) and alien control of movement (ACM) conditions (Figure 2b).  
During the preparation interval, relative to voluntary movement, ACM was associated with decreased 
activity in left hemisphere brain regions that are known to be active during voluntary movement – 
specifically left SMA extending to sensorimotor areas.  Also during the movement interval, reduced 
activation occurred in left middle temporal gyrus, precentral and superior occipital areas, in right 
superior frontal gyrus, and bilaterally in mid-cingulate cortex and mid-frontal areas.  Writing 
movements attributed to alien control resulted in significantly increased activation in the cerebellum 
(preparation interval) and parietal cortex (movement interval), specifically the left angular gyrus 
(Table 1b; Figure 2b). Cerebellar activity increased during preparation only, while increased parietal 
activity was confined solely to the movement phase.   
 
3.5 Functional connectivity patterns for the TI and ACM contrasts. 
 
A psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis (Friston et al., 1997) was conducted to assess the 
influence of suggestions for thought insertion and alien control of movement on changes in functional 
connectivity with SMA associated with response preparation and execution during writing.   
 
3.6 Psychophysiological interaction (PPI): Thought insertion contrast (TI vs. VOL) 
During suggestions of thought insertion in the preparation interval functional connectivity (FC) 
decreased between the SMA seed and left mid-cingulum, left SPL and right mid-frontal gyrus.  In the 
movement interval, FC decreased between the SMA and bilateral precuneus and left calcarine gyrus 
(p = 0.055).  In the preparation interval, the M1 seed showed increased FC with left cerebellum and 
right superior temporal pole.  No changes in connectivity were observed during the movement interval 
for the M1 seed (see Figure 3a and Table 3a). 
 
3.7 Psychophysiological interaction (PPI): Alien control of movement contrast (ACM vs. VOL) 
During suggestions of alien control of movement, the preparation interval was associated with greater 
functional connectivity between the SMA and bilateral posterior cingulum, right precuneus, left 
frontal gyrus, right angular gyrus, right postcentral gyrus (somatosensory cortex), left mid-occipital, 
left mid-temporal and left inferior parietal lobule (IPL).  In the movement interval, FC increased 
between the SMA and bilateral pre- and post-central gyri (motor strip and somatosensory cortices), 
left frontal gyrus and left supramarginal gyrus.  During the preparation interval, FC of the M1 seed 
increased with right cerebellum but decreased with right paracentral lobule, bilateral precuneus, and 
bilateral ACC (anterior cingulate cortex; p=0.059).  In the movement interval, during suggestions of 
alien control of movement, FC increased between M1 and right fusiform gyrus and left thalamus (see 
Figure 3b and Table 3b).  
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Table 3.  SPM functional connectivity results for the contrast between a) suggested thought insertion (TI) 
and voluntary writing (VOL) and b) suggested alien control of movement (ACM) and voluntary writing (VOL) 
for the SMA and M1 seeds. 
Seed Hemisphere Anatomical  Region MNI 
coordinates 
x, y, z 
BA Cluster 
size 
Z 
value 
Cluster-
level  
p corrected 
a) THOUGHT INSERTION CONTRAST 
 Preparation Interval VOL > TI     
SMA L Mid-cingulum -10, 14, 30 24 13739 4.60 0.000 
 R Mid-frontal  28, 4, 46 6  4.38  
 L Superior parietal  -16, -64, 46 7  4.26  
 Movement interval      
SMA L *Precuneus -2, -66, 44 7 1288 4.18 0.055 
 L Calcarine -12, -70, 20 18  3.69  
 R Precuneus 6, -70, 38 7  3.66  
 Preparation Interval TI > VOL    
M1 L Cerebellum -20, -46, -20 37  4.30 0.001 
 R Superior temporal 
pole 
30, 6, -24 38  4.01  
b) ALIEN CONTROL OF MOVEMENT CONTRAST 
 Preparation Interval VOL < ACM     
SMA L Posterior cingulum -8, -46, 30 23 3780 6.04 0.000 
 R Posterior cingulum 6, -48, 28 23  4.61  
 R Precuneus 14, -52, 40 -  4.30  
 L Superior frontal  -20, 16, 44 32 1831 4.81 0.017 
 L Mid-frontal  -36, 8 50 6  4.59  
 R Angular  54, -60, 24 39 1672 4.21 0.026 
 R Postcentral  48, -10, 26 48  3.39  
 L Mid-occipital  -34, -84, 38 19 1633 3.59 0.029 
 L Mid-temporal  -52, -60, 14 37  3.39  
 L Inferior parietal  -52, -56, 42 39  3.35  
 Movement interval      
SMA R Precentral  40, -14, 50 6 3961 4.49 0.000 
 R Postcentral  64, -16, 34 43  4.14  
 L Superior frontal  -16, 18, 42 32 1836 4.21 0.012 
 L Precentral  -36, -2, 50 6  4.09  
 L Mid-frontal  -24, 10, 46 6?  3.81  
 L Postcentral  -48, -16, 32 3 1511 3.88 0.029 
 L Supramarginal  -50, -30, 32 2  3.55  
 Preparation Interval ACM < VOL     
M1 R Cerebellum 20, -24, -26 30 2194 3.85 0.006 
 R *Paracentral lobule 4, -42, 70 5 1305 3.96 0.059 
 R *Precuneus 12, -52, 70 5,7  3.56  
 R *Anterior cingulate  8, 38, -2 11 1309 3.77 0.059 
 L *Anterior cingulate  -8, 32, -4 11  3.34  
 Movement interval VOL < ACM     
M1 R Fusiform 24, -32, -18 30 6289 4.13 0.000 
 L Thalamus -22, -26, -2 -  4.13  
Notes: *clusters approaching significance only.   
BA = Brodmann Area.  Significance levels corrected at p<0.01.  
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Figure 3.  Schematic figure depicting functional connectivity patterns between SMA and M1 seed regions during 
suggestions of a) thought insertion (TI) and b) alien control of movement (ACM).  Green = increased FC, and Red 
= decreased FC.  (For indication of depth, i.e. z values, and specific peak voxel coordinates, see Table 3a, b). 
*clusters approaching significance only; see Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
In this study fMRI was combined with a subjective experience of automatic writing created by hypnotic 
suggestion to investigate the neural bases of thought insertion and alien control of movement in 
healthy human volunteers. The findings demonstrate that feelings of control and ownership for 
thought and movement components of writing can be independently manipulated (Walsh et al., 
2014).  During suggestions of thought insertion, participants’ ratings for control and ownership of the 
thought, but not the movement component of writing were reduced relative to voluntary control.  
During suggestions of alien control of movement, the reverse was true.  Targeted suggestions, 
therefore selectively produced experiences of alien control for thought and movement, modelling 
passivity phenomena in schizophrenia as well as culturally influenced alterations in experience (such 
as mediumship or possession states).  To investigate the neural bases of experiences of thought 
insertion and alien control of movement, we compared fMRI data for the voluntary and respective 
alien control conditions.   
 
 
4.1 Functional anatomy of alien control of movement 
 
In the alien control of movement condition, during the preparation interval (thinking of a sentence 
ending), the alien control of movement relative to the voluntary condition was associated with 
decreased activity in a network of brain regions involved in voluntary movement, including left 
supplementary motor area (SMA), cortical sensory-motor hand areas and thalamus.  Alien control of 
movement was also associated with increased activation in left cerebellum and lingual gyrus in the 
preparation interval, and parietal cortex - specifically the left angular gyrus - during the movement 
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interval (i.e. writing down the sentence ending) (Table 1b; Figure 2b).  These findings are consistent 
with the cerebellar-parietal network identified in a previous study (S. J. Blakemore et al., 2003), which 
also used hypnotic suggestion but in combination with PET neuroimaging, to model alien control of 
movement in healthy individuals.  In that previous study, increased activation of a bilateral cerebellar 
parietal network was associated with a misattribution of movement (raising the left arm) to an 
external source.  The cerebellar-parietal activity increases observed for experiences of alien control of 
writing movements in the present study confirm and extend this prior study by separating the 
preparation and execution stages of movement, and identifying a role for the left angular gyrus during 
control of writing.   
 
The left angular gyrus has long been associated with writing - for example, lesions to this region are 
associated with agraphia (Gerstmann, 1942; Rusconi et al., 2009) - suggesting that increased activity 
in this region is specific to modulation of the perceived control and/or sensory awareness of writing 
movements. More generally, a cerebellar-parietal network was identified as being engaged in 
detecting mismatches between predicted and actual action consequences, and between feedback 
from different sensory modalities that convey body-related information (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; 
Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 2004; Synofzik et al., 2008; Tsakiris, Costantini, & Haggard, 2008). Our 
findings are therefore consistent with previous proposals that increased cerebellar-parietal activity 
during the experience of alien control of movement may result from attenuation of feedforward 
inhibition of somatosensory processing that occurs during voluntary movements (S. J. Blakemore et 
al., 2003).  A prefrontal cortical origin for feedforward inhibition of sensory processing of voluntary 
movements has previously been proposed (Frith, 2005).  Supplementary motor area (SMA) has been 
identified as the prefrontal source of feedforward inhibition on the basis of abolition of the sensory 
suppression effect for voluntary actions by transcranial magnetic stimulation of the SMA (Haggard & 
Whitford, 2004). The established role of the SMA in voluntary movement planning and initiation, and 
the present finding that SMA activity decreases during alien control of movement where self-
generated movements are experienced as involuntary, is consistent with the proposed role of the SMA 
in feedforward inhibition.  Importantly, subjective ratings of control and ownership as well as brain 
activations for suggested alien control of movement (ACM) and simulated alien control of movement 
(SIM) differed (Figure 1c,d), suggesting that participants were not engaging in simulation strategies 
(Table 2).  In summary, findings from the alien control of movement condition are consistent with the 
forward model of motor control, in that they confirm and extend prior findings of parietal-cerebellar 
overactivation whilst assigning them to movement preparation and implementation respectively.  
Reduced SMA activation during preparation for alien control of movement may correspond to 
attenuation of feedforward inhibition of a self-generated motor intention.   
 
 
4.2 Functional anatomy of thought insertion 
 
Compared to alien control of movement, thought insertion was associated with reduced activation in 
a largely non-overlapping network of brain regions. Thinking of a sentence ending involves semantic 
and lexical processing, so that the experience of thought insertion by an “engineer” during the 
preparation interval entailed a loss of the sense of control and ownership of semantic and lexical 
content generated in response to the sentence stem. The contrast of voluntary writing with the 
thought insertion condition showed that during the preparation interval, this altered sense of control 
and ownership of semantic and lexical content was associated with a relative decrease in activity in 
networks supporting language, movement, and self-related processing. For example, regions showing 
reduced activation that are involved in language processing and writing included superior temporal 
gyri (BA 41/42) bilaterally and right mid-temporal gyrus (BA 21) (Howard et al., 2000; Liebenthal, 
Binder, Spitzer, Possing, & Medler, 2005); subcortical basal ganglia and striatum, which allow parietal 
systems involved in linguistic and graphemic processing to access the frontal motor systems that 
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mediate writing (Anderson, Saver, Tranel, & Damasio, 1993; Duffau et al., 2002); and the thalamus, 
which is involved in the integration of cognitive and motoric aspects of language production (Hebb & 
Ojemann, 2012).   Visual processing areas of right inferior occipital gyrus (BA 37) and left superior 
occipital gyrus (BA 19) - which may support imagery (Rainville, Hofbauer, Bushnell, Duncan, & Price, 
2002) during sentence generation - also showed reduced activation during the experience of thought 
insertion.  Similarly, reduced activation was also shown in the precuneus bilaterally, brain regions 
involved in somatosensory integration during co-ordination of hand movements as well as 
contributing to the self-other distinction and sense of agency (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006). Notably, 
there were no measurable differences in the lexical characteristics of sentence endings, excluding this 
as a potential explanation of reduced activation in networks during the experience of thought 
insertion.  
 
 
4.3 Functional connectivity of alien control 
 
We also employed psychophysiological interaction (PPI) (Friston et al., 1997) to examine the effect of 
suggestions of thought insertion and alien control of movement on functional connectivity (FC) during 
writing. We tested the hypothesis that alien control of thought and movement is associated with 
reductions in functional connectivity between preparatory (SMA) and motor (primary motor cortex 
M1) seed regions when comparing the normal experience of writing with writing following targeted 
suggestions for alien control.  Our main finding from the connectivity analyses was that the SMA 
showed reduced connectivity during thought insertion and increased connectivity during alien control 
of movement with largely distinct networks for type of alien control (thought insertion, movement) 
and phase of automatic writing (preparation, movement). M1 connectivity also showed changes in 
connectivity with distinct networks that varied with type of alien control and writing phase.  Viewed 
in combination with our prior findings of reduced SMA connectivity during suggested involuntary 
joystick movement, these results indicate that while brain connectivity alters during the experience of 
alien control phenomena, changes are condition specific and do not represent a general pattern 
present across different types of alien control experience (Quinton Deeley et al., 2013).    
 
 
4.4 Role for SMA in alien control 
While thought insertion and alien control of movement were associated with distinct changes in brain 
activity and connectivity, both experiences of alien control nevertheless involved a reduction in 
activity of left supplementary motor area (SMA).  This raises the question of the contribution of SMA 
to feelings of control and ownership of thought and movement and their loss in alien control 
phenomena, particularly when viewed in the context of differences in brain activation and 
connectivity for the respective conditions.  Forward model or comparator accounts of agency (S.-J. 
Blakemore & Frith, 2003; Synofzik et al., 2008; Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000) have proposed that the 
loss of the sense of agency results from a disruption of feedforward inhibition of somatosensory 
processing for self-generated movements. On this account, participants’ experiences of alien control 
of movement in the present study are mediated by cerebellar-parietal overactivation resulting from 
loss of the sensory suppression effect for voluntary movements - associated with reduced SMA 
activation (Haggard & Whitford, 2004).  By analogy it has been proposed that forward modelling also 
occurs during thinking, which when disrupted results in loss of a sense of agency for thoughts, as in 
thought insertion (Frith, 2005). In the present study, thought insertion was not associated with 
overactivation of somatosensory or other self-monitoring networks as occurred in the case of 
movement, further suggesting that forward model or comparator accounts of motor agency may not 
be applicable to experiences of thought insertion. Thus, our results are consistent with the critique of 
the forward model, that thoughts, unlike movements, do not have well defined sensorimotor 
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characteristics that could inform feedforward inhibition of self-monitoring systems (Synofzik et al., 
2008).   
 
An alternative interpretation of our findings is that apart from its proposed role as the prefrontal 
source of the sensory suppression effect for voluntary movement, the SMA has a more general role in 
contributing to the sense of control and ownership across the modalities of thought and movement 
(Quinton Deeley et al., 2013)  In this executive control model, reduction in SMA activation underpins 
the loss of control and ownership occurring in thought insertion and alien control of movement 
respectively. Nevertheless, the consistent reduction in SMA activity underpinning loss of control and 
ownership appears to be task and modality dependent, as evidenced by differences in SMA 
connectivity between different types of alien control. A more complete cognitive account of alien 
control phenomena must therefore accommodate specific features of each phenomenon – for 
example, whether thought or movement is affected.  In the case of thought insertion, an executive 
control interpretation of reduced SMA activity helps explain the absence of overactivation of self-
monitoring systems that would be predicted by the forward model. In the case of alien control of 
movement, an executive control interpretation would entail that a lack of sensory suppression 
associated with increased cerebellar-parietal activations may underlie an altered sensory quality of 
unexpected movements, rather than the loss of the sense of their control and ownership per se.   
An executive control model is also relevant to understanding similarities and differences between 
thought insertion and auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH), which are both first rank symptoms of 
schizophrenia but which also occur in the general population (Linden et al., 2010; Oyebode, 2008; Van 
Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, & Krabbendam, 2009).   Auditory verbal hallucinations occur 
when a patient reports hearing a voice or voices when no such sound is present, whereas during 
thought insertion the patient “believes that thoughts that are not his own have been inserted into his 
mind” (Mullins & Spence, 2003). While both symptoms are experienced as intrusions generated by 
external agents, they differ in important respects. For example, in most cases, patients diagnosed with 
AVH report hearing a specific voice in external space with an identity and gender (Langdon, Jones, 
Connaughton, & Fernyhough, 2009), as opposed to the lack of distinct auditory characteristics of an 
inserted thought.  Moreover, the majority of patients with schizophrenia and persistent AVH can 
clearly distinguish them from their thoughts (Hoffman, Varanko, Gilmore, & Mishara, 2008). 
Nevertheless, the fact that both AVHs and thought insertion are experienced as external intrusions 
raises the question of whether a shared neural mechanism reducing the sense of ownership and 
agency for self-generated mental contents is involved. In a study employing fMRI in patients with 
schizophrenia, reduced SMA activation differentiated AVH from verbal imagery (Raij & Riekki, 2012). 
Another study in a non-clinical sample showed that the timing of SMA activation with fronto-temporal 
activation was delayed during AVH relative to auditory imagery (Linden et al., 2010).   These results 
suggest that reduced or altered timing of SMA activity might relate to the loss of the sense of 
ownership of one's own verbal imagery (Allen, Larøi, McGuire, & Aleman, 2008; Jardri, Pouchet, Pins, 
& Thomas, 2011; McGuire et al., 1995).  These results relating to AVHs are consistent with our findings 
of reduced SMA activity and connectivity during thought insertion, and suggest a more general role 
for SMA in mediating the sense of control and ownership for a range of mental contents, such as 
experiences of movement, thought, and auditory imagery. These proposals could be directly tested in 
future studies employing suggestion and fMRI.  
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Prior studies have implicated parietal regions (BA 39/40) in the sense of agency (Desmurget et al., 
2009; Spence et al., 1997). The present study provides evidence for different roles for parietal cortex 
in alien control of movement and thought insertion experiences. Specifically, alien control of 
movement was associated with increased activation of parietal cortex (angular gyrus, BA 19) during 
movement execution, while thought insertion during the preparation interval was associated with 
decreased parietal cortical activation (bilateral precuneus, BA 7). Consequently, a shared role for 
parietal cortex across both alien control of movement and thought insertion is not evident from these 
data alone.  
The present study showed that suggestions for alien control of movement and thought insertion 
respectively were associated with small reductions in awareness compared to voluntary thought and 
movement following induction of hypnosis.  The estimates of effect size for these reductions were 
considerably lower than for control and ownership. Also, a regression analysis of awareness ratings 
with brain activity did not show any relationships, including in areas of altered activity associated with 
suggested loss of control.  Differences in brain activity and connectivity are therefore unlikely to be 
attributable to reductions in awareness during thought insertion and alien control of movement.  
It could be argued that variations in kinematic factors such as force, speed, and acceleration of 
movement might have contributed to differences of BOLD activation between the movement 
conditions. While we did not use EMG recordings, writing did not differ between conditions in terms 
of the amount written, appearance, time of writing onset or duration.  This suggests that is unlikely 
that differences in written output explain differences in BOLD signal between conditions. Further, 
kinematics cannot explain the differences in BOLD signal during the preparation period, because 
participants were not moving. Importantly, distinct changes were observed during the ACM and TI 
condition in both preparation and movement intervals, further suggesting that between condition 
differences cannot be attributed to kinematic differences. 
We measured brain activity during thought insertion and alien control of movement in healthy 
volunteers in the same experimental session. However, other alien control or passivity experiences 
(such as “made” speech sensations, or emotions) were not investigated. Also, involuntary inhibition 
(e.g. limb paralysis) as well as production of a given function (e.g. involuntary movement) were not 
included in the same experimental session (Bell, Oakley, Halligan, & Deeley, 2011; Q. Deeley et al., 
2013).  Future studies could therefore employ suggestions and fMRI to experimentally model these 
phenomena, allowing the respective contribution of SMA and other relevant brain regions (such as 
parietal cortex) to be investigated across a range of alterations of agency and ownership. 
The experimental paradigm combined suggestions for automatic writing and fMRI to create an 
experimental model of thought insertion and alien control of movement similar to those clinically 
reported by patients with schizophrenia, as well as culturally influenced dissociative alterations in 
consciousness (Deeley, 2013; David A Oakley & Halligan, 2013). In the case of culturally influenced 
automatic writing, implicit suggestive processes based on social modelling and implicit learning may 
produce similar changes in experience and brain function to the present experiment (Walsh et al., 
2014).  This could be directly tested in future studies with practitioners of automatic writing. In the 
case of schizophrenia, passivity phenomena such as thought insertion and alien control of movement 
may be underpinned by alterations in the function and connectivity of regional brain networks as 
modelled in the present study. However, in schizophrenia the altered function and connectivity of 
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regions and networks identified in the present study may arise from dysregulation of executive and 
other brain systems associated with abnormal brain anatomy and neuromodulatory systems (Fornito, 
Yücel, Patti, Wood, & Pantelis, 2009), rather than the effects of some form of suggestion.  
Nevertheless, proposals about the cross-modal role of the SMA in control and ownership of thought 
and movement, and the contribution of disrupted sensory suppression effects to the sensory quality 
rather than the sense of control of movements, could inform future investigations of passivity 
phenomena in schizophrenia.  
 
4.5 Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, the present study has clearly demonstrated that thought insertion, as well as alien 
control of movement, can be experimentally studied. During the experience of thought insertion, 
there was no evidence of increased activity in regions involved in self-monitoring as predicted by 
comparator or forward models. Specifically, reduced activity in language production regions, and not 
overactivation of cerebellar-parietal regions, was present during thought insertion. By contrast, 
previous findings of parietal cortical and cerebellar overactivation during alien control of movement 
were confirmed and extended by showing these to be restricted to movement preparation and 
implementation respectively. Thought insertion and alien control of movement were also associated 
with discrete changes in the functional coupling of SMA and M1.   While thought insertion and alien 
control of movement were associated with distinct changes in brain activity and connectivity, both 
experiences involved a reduction in activity of left SMA. Collectively these findings suggest that the 
SMA plays a key role in the generation of alien control phenomena, as a high level executive system 
involved in the control and ownership of thought and movement. 
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